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CASE COMMENT
JUNK SCIENCE IN FEDERAL COURTS:
JUDICIAL UNDERSTANDING OF SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES
Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)
Todd R. Samelman*
The parents of a deformed child, petitioners, filed suit alleging that the
anti-nausea drug bendectin,' produced by Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., respondent, was the in-utero 2 teratogenic3 cause of their child's
limb-reduction4 defects.' The lower courts granted respondent summary
judgment because petitioners failed to prove causation, and because the
Daubert court deemed their experts' testimony as not generally accepted
and thus excluded it.6 Petitioners appealed, challenging the inadmissibility
* J.D. Candidate University of Florida Levin College of Law; Ph.D. University of South
Florida College of Medicine.
1. Bendectin is a drug composed of doylamine and pyridoxine that is used to treat nausea
and vomiting in pregnant women. See Reprotox Database, (1999), available at http://reprotox.org/
samples/1035.html (last modified Oct. 1, 2001).
2. Within the uterus.
3. Teratogen is any type of environment or chemical agent that causes the abnormal
development of the fetus. See IRA G. Dox ET AL., THE HARPER COLLINS ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 470 (Harper Perennial 1993).
4. See HENRY GRAY, GRAY'S ANATOMY 122-23 (Roger Warwick & Peter L. Williams eds.,
35th British ed., W.B. Saunders Comp. 1973). At the four-week period of fetal development, limb
buds appear. Id. The upper and lower limbs develop similarly though the upper limb development
precedes lower limb by a few days. Id. At the end of week eight, the limbs have attained their
correct position. Id. In this position the elbows point caudally (nearer to the feet) and the knees
cranially (nearer to the head). Id. These limb bud growth periods are critical growth periods for
limb development, as the introduction of teratogens during this time can lead to limb reduction
defects. Id.
5. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582 (1993).
6. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991); Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 575 (S.D. Cal. 1989). The trial court granted
respondent's motion for summary judgment, ruling that petitioners' experts failed to base their
results on epidemiological studies. See id. at 571. Federal courts viewed epidemiological studies
as the most reliable method for determining causation. See id. at 575. Petitioners appealed and the
case was consolidated with a similar bendectin suit in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
District. See Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1128. That court affirmed the summary judgment ruling, basing
its decision on the lack of general acceptance of the experts' testimony. See id. at 1130-31. It held
that general acceptance was the standard for reviewing admissibility of expert testimony and that
petitioners' experts failed to meet this standard. See id. The Court of Appeals reasoned that for a
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oftheir experts' testimony, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.'
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, remanded, and HELD, that Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence,' not the common law rule of general
acceptance first proposed in Frye v. UnitedStates,9 provided the standard
for admission of expert scientific testimony in federal courts.'0
In Frye, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia" established
the federal courts' general acceptance standard for the admissibility of
expert opinion. 2 On appeal of a murder conviction, the defendant in Frye
claimed that the results of the so-called "deception test"' 3 were admissible
evidence. 4 The Court of Appeals held that the admissibility of expert
testimony was limited to generally accepted theories and ideas in the
relevant discipline. 5 Because the "deception test" did not have recognition
within the scientific community, its results were inadmissible. 6 Federal
courts have applied this standard for almost seventy years.
Over the seventy-year use of the Frye standard, only the admissibility
of lie detector tests received negative treatment; the Frye standard itself
was rarely challenged. 7 In 1975, the revised Federal Rules of Evidence
altered the standards for the admissibility of expert testimony with Rule
702.' These new evidentiary standards introduced an inconsistency
between the Frye standard and that of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Federal courts tried to reconcile this inconsistency either by following the

given scientific methodology to be admissible, it could not significantly diverge from accepted
procedures. See id.If the methodology did diverge, it could not be deemed a generally accepted
technique. See id.
7. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 506 U.S. 914 (1992).
8. As a result of Daubert, 506 U.S. at 914, the Federal Rules of Evidence were revised in
2000. See Marlow, infra note 71. Thus, the former version of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (1999)
will be used for this part of the discussion. Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 702 (1999) stated: "If

scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto inthe form of an opinion or otherwise." FED.
R. EviD. 702.
9. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
10. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89.
11. The present day name is the U.S. Court of Appeals for D.C. Circuit.
12. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014. The Frye court stated that "while courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id.
13. An early lie detector.
14. See Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
15. See id.at 1014.
16. See id.
17. See, e.g., McMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458 (1981).
18. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (1999).

CASE COMMENT

revised Federal Rules of Evidence or by ignoring the changes and
continuing to follow the Frye standard.' 9
In UnitedStates v. Shorter,2" decided after the 1975 revision, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the general
acceptance standard for reviewing the admissibility of expert testimony. 1
Appellant was convicted of willfully evading payment of income taxes
after the exclusion of his experts' testimony.22 According to the proffered
testimony, the appellant, as a pathological gambler, lacked the criminal
intent to evade the law.23 The Court of Appeals addressed whether an error
occurred in failing to admit appellant's experts' testimony that such an
illness existed. 24 The Court affirmed the lower court's exclusion of the
testimony stating that the scientific community did not generally accept a
link between pathological gambling and tax evasion.25
Three years later, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit rejected the general acceptance theory in Deluca v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.26 The issue at trial was whether appellant's
statistical technique for proving causation was generally accepted.2 7 The
trial court employed the Frye general acceptance standard and excluded
the testimony. 28 Reversing, the Court of Appeals ruled that the admission
29
of expert testimony must be analyzed solely under Rule 702 standards.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the instant case because
of the sharp divisions in the standards used for determining the
admissibility of expert testimony in federal courts.30 The U.S. Supreme
Court held that the general acceptance standard of Frye no longer
determined the admissibility of expert testimony. Instead, federal courts
should employ the admissibility requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.3 ' The instant Court stated that Rule 702 superseded the
holding in Frye.32
In deciding the instant case, the U.S. Supreme Court examined the
language of revised Rule 702 and reviewed the notes of the revision
19. See e.g., infra text accompanying notes 20 and 26.
20. 809 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
21. See id. at 59-60.
22. See id. at 55-56.
23. See id. at 59.
24. See id. at 55.
25. See id. at 60 (stating that Frye is still the law of the land).
26. 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990).
27. See id. at 943.
28. See id. at 943-44. The argument centered around the confidence levels for type l and type
II statistical errors. Id.
29. See id. at 954-57.
30. See Daubert,509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993).
31. See id. at 588-89.
32. See id. at 587.
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committee. However, the notes showed no incorporation of the general
acceptance standard into the Rules. 3 According to the Court, the revision
committee intended to liberalize the standards for admission of expert
testimony."a Thus, the Court relaxed the strict standards of Frye, ruled
incompatible with Rule 702. 3"
The replacement of general acceptance by Rule 702 did not end all
standards, however.3 6 Until the instant case, trial judges determined only
whether the expert's methodology was generally accepted.37 Daubert
provided trial judges with the discretion to allow evidence if it complied
with the two prongs of Rule 702 as elucidated by the U.S. Supreme
Court.s First, the scientific testimony must be reliable, and second, it must
be relevant to the case.39 The instant case also provided trial judges with
a number of non-exclusive and non-dispositive guidelines to follow when
deciding whether to admit expert testimony.4 ° While the Court in the
instant case abandoned the general acceptance standard, widespread
acceptance may still be an important factor in determining admissibility
of expert testimony under these guidelines.41 Stressing methodology over
conclusions, the U.S. Supreme Court in the instant case stated that a trial
judge's evaluation of expert testimony should focus on the methods and
techniques of the expert, not on the results generated by the data.42 When
the U.S. Supreme Court instructed trial judges to evaluate scientific
testimony in the way described above, it gave the trial judges freedom to
use their gatekeeper function.43
Following in the footsteps of Daubert,the U.S. Supreme Court further
explained how to apply Rule 702 in light of the instant holding. 44 Ruling
33. See id. at 588.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 589.
36. See id.
37. See Frye, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
38. See Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
39. See id. at 592-93. The Court stated that the topic of the expert's testimony must be
scientific for it to be reliable, whereas Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provided the definition for
relevance. Id. The rule describes how any factual evidence that makes the determination of a suit
more or less probable than without the evidence is a relevant fact. Id.
40. See id. at 593-94. The factors given by the Court include, i) whether the scientific theory
or methodology can be tested, 2) whether the data has been published in a peer reviewed journal,
3) whether the potential error rate of the technique or method in question is known, and 4) whether
the theory or methodology has been generally accepted. Id.
41. See id. at 593-94.
42. Id. at 595; see also FED. R. EVID. 104(a-b) ("(a) Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of privilege or the admissibility of evidence
shall be determined by the court, subject to the provision of subdivision. (b) In making its
determinations it is not bound by the rules except those with respect to privilege.").
43. Id. at 597.
44. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139-41, 143 (1997). Petitioner brought suit
alleging that his lung cancer was promoted by exposure to chemicals and fumes at his workplace.
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that the Court of Appeals applied an overly stringent method of review in
reversing the lower court, the U.S. Supreme Court held the abuse of
discretion standard applied to the review of the admissibility of scientific
testimony.45 By upholding the abuse of discretion standard, the U.S.
Supreme Court maintained the trial judge's role as the gatekeeper of
scientific evidence.46
The U.S. Supreme Court has also examined the limitation of Daubert
to scientific evidence.47 Reversing a lower court ruling, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the Daubert standard applied to all expert testimony.48
Daubert referred to scientific knowledge only because the issue in that
case was one of science.49
While Daubertprovides trial judges with enormous power, the U.S.
Supreme Court acknowledged that with this power comes great
responsibility.5" The ruling in Daubert, nevertheless, left many in the
scientific community with a realistic fear that trial judges were
inadequately prepared to separate good science from junk science. With
the ever-growing base of scientific knowledge, answering the question of
what expert testimony is admissible becomes an increasingly daunting task
for trial judges.5 Because of these concerns, commentators are asking
whether the federal trial courts can still effectively serve the gatekeeping
function provided in Daubert.52 Because of this burden created by Daubert
and the advances in scientific research, it is an almost impossible task for
district court judges to adequately understand and evaluate complex
scientific methods.
Id. at 140. Summary judgment was granted to respondent, reversed by the Court of Appeals and
reinstated by the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 140-41. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled the Court of
Appeals "overly stringent" standard of review was incorrect and that the standard of review was
abuse of discretion. Id. at 143.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 142.
47. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 146 (1999). The district court
excluded expert testimony of the plaintiffs because the methodology used was not based on all four
Daubert factors. Id. at 145-46. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court and
held that the Daubert factors did not apply to the skill or experience-based testimony of the
plaintiff's expert. Id. at 146. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the 11 th Circuit's ruling and stated
that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 applies to testimony based on technical or other specialized
knowledge as well as to scientific expertise. Id. at 158.
48. Id. at 141.
49. See id.
50. See Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
51. See GeneralElec. Co., 522 U.S. at 147-48 (Breyer, J. concurring).
52. See Michael H. Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or Double
Error?, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 753, 758 (1998) (stating that under Daubert, the Court made the
assumption that a judge was better equipped than the expert to decide whether the testimony was
reliable). Michael Gottesman was the attorney that won Daubert at the U.S. Supreme Court level
but lost on remand in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Two recent examples of scientific inquiry reinforce this doubt. First,
for many years the scientific community believed that stress and acid
release caused stomach ulcers. 3 In 1983, Barry Marshall and Robin
Warren at Royal Perth Hospital in Western Australia, proposed that a
bacterium, now called Helicobacterpylori,caused ulcers. 4 The experts in
the field literally laughed at this proposal, although it was based on sound
scientific principles." Dr. Marshall decided to end the controversy by
volunteering as the human guinea pig, consuming a cocktail of the bacteria
and recording the results.56 This experiment confirmed the theory of
bacterial induced ulcers and is now the recognized etiology of the
affliction."
The second instance involved the theory that high power electric lines
caused cancer.5 Dr. Robert Lidburdy, of the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, published studies linking the electric and magnetic fields
(EMF) from power lines to changes in cellular function.59 Published in
highly respected peer reviewed scientific journals, the scientific
community accepted the data in these articles as valid.6" Although the
articles helped to establish a cottage industry, 6' Dr. Lidburdy forged these
data.6 2 Seven years after the publication of Dr. Lidburdy's last manuscript
about EMF, the Office of Research Integrity (ORI) of the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) made its final findings regarding Dr.
Lidburdy's research.63 ORI's report stated that Dr. Lidburdy intentionally
53. See, e.g., Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Helicobacterpylori and Peptic
Ulcer Disease:Historyof Ulcer Diagnosisand Treatment, availableat http://www.cdc.gov/ulcer/
history.htm (last reviewed Feb. 2, 2001) (providing the history of scientific thought regarding
ulcers).
54. See J. Robin Warren & Barry Marshall, Unidentified Curved Bacilli on Gastric
Epithelium in Active Chronic Gastritis,335 THE LANCET 1273-74 (1983).
55. See, e.g., Jim Warren, Many Still Ignorant of Ulcer Treatment: Antibiotics Now Given
to Combat the Bacterium Known to Cause Ailment, THE AKRON BEACON J., (Sept. 1, 1998),
availableat http://www.lef.org/fda-museum/6_delaytherapies/akron_090198. html.
56. See id.
57. See Center for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 53.
58. See Robert P. Lidburdy, BiologicalInteractionsof CellularSystems with Time-Varying
Magnetic Fields, 649 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. OF Sci. 74, 92 (1992); see also Robert P. Lidburdy,
Calcium Signaling in Lymphocytes and ELFFields, 301 FEBS LETTERS 53, 58-59 (1992).
59. See id.
60. Annals of the New York Academy of Science and FEBS Letters are two highly respected
and well known scholarly scientific publications.
61. See, e.g., John W. Farley, Power Lines and Cancer: Nothing to Fear, at http://www.
quackwatch.com/cgi-bin/mfs/24/home/sbinfo/public-html/0 IQuackeryRelatedTopics/emf.html?
305#mfs (last visited Dec. 19, 2001). (Entrepreneurs have prayed on the fears of the public offering
items such as the "Cell Sensor," which allows consumers to instantly detect EMF or low magnetic
field electronics for "electrically hypersensitive" people.)
62. National Institute of Health Guide: Findings of Scientific Misconduct (June 18, 1999),
at http://www.grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/not99- 11 .html.
63. Id.
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falsified and fabricated data about the purported effects of EMF.' This
misconduct led to sanctioning by the government funding agencies
sponsoring his research and a ban on contributing to, advising, or
consulting with HHS for a period of years.65
These examples of scientific inquiry demonstrate that even experts in
their particular fields have difficulty in discerning good science from "junk
science." If the scientific community cannot recognize the
validity/invalidity of scientific theories, how can the courts? Dr. Marshall's
early conclusions would be inadmissible under Frye and more than likely
thrown out under Daubert. The scientific community did not generally
accept the science; the data collected was not based upon reliable scientific
methodology and ipse dixit of the scientist.' As in Daubert, only the
authors of the data professed that the data provided an alternate to the
established theory.67 Thus, even though an expert in the field deduced the
correct etiology of ulcers, the data would be inadmissible as expert
testimony under either the Frye or Daubertstandards. Alternatively, EMF
and cancer causation was an accepted theory based on seemingly reliable
scientific methodology and would pass the Frye general acceptance
requirement." Although, Dr. Lidburdy's data satisfied the reliability
standards of Daubertand the general acceptance theory of Frye, the data
still constituted junk science.
With the complex issues surrounding expert opinion and expert
shopping by the litigants, trial judges must exercise great care and
diligence in determining admissibility of expert testimony.69 Many
remedies exist to assist trial judges with the arduous task of evaluating
scientific testimony. These remedies include bringing in court appointed
experts 70pursuant to Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Rule
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
Daubert,

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 157 (1999).
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, supranote 53.
Lidburdy, supra note 58.
John A. Livingood, Jr., Admissibilityand reliabilityof Expert Scientific Testimony after
61 DEF. CoIrNs. J. 19, 20 (1994).

70. FED. R. EVID. 706 states:

(a) Appointment. The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party
enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and
may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert
witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own
selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed by the court unless the witness
consents to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed of the witness' duties
by the court in writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a
conference in which the parties shall have opportunity to participate. A witness so
appointed shall advise the parties of the witness' findings, if any; the witness'
deposition may be taken by any party; and the witness may be called to testify by
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706), sua sponte ex parte communications 7' between trial judges and
scientists, and a change in the standard of review for admissibility of
expert testimony.
Rule 706 allows trial judges to appoint their own impartial experts.72
These experts can fill in the gaps of knowledge left by the litigants'
experts 73 and offer opinions to trial judges for their Rule 104 admissibility
hearings. 74 Moreover, Rule 706 experts can aid judges in their Rule 702
Daubertgatekeeping role. 75 Assuming adequate jury instructions are used
to ameliorate the risks of infallibility and exceptional weight concerns,
Rule 706 is a useful tool for trial judges.76
Second, one commentator has stated that sua sponte ex parte
communication can also aid in providing a trial judge with the information
necessary for admissibility decisions. 77 If the ethical 7 and the almost
insurmountable due process79 standards can be satisfied, these
communications can have the same facilitating effect as appointing experts
under Rule 706.
the court or any party. The witness shall be subject to cross-examination by each
party, including a party calling the witness. (b) Compensation. Expert witnesses
so appointed are entitled to reasonable compensation in whatever sum the court
may allow. The compensation thus fixed is payable from funds which may be
provided by law in criminal cases and civil actions and proceedings involving just
compensation under the fifth amendment. In other civil actions and proceedings
the compensation shall be paid by the parties in such proportion and at such time
as the court directs, and thereafter charged, in like manner as other costs.
(c) Disclosure of appointment. In the exercise of its discretion, the court may
authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the expert
witness. (d) Parties' experts of own selection. Nothing in this rule limits the parties
in calling expert witnesses of their own selection.
FED. R. EVID. 706 (2001).
71. George D. Marlow, From Black Robes to White Lab Coats: The EthicalImplications of
a Judge's Sua Sponte, Ex Parte Acquisition of Social and other Scientific Evidence During the
Decision-MakingProcess,72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 291,292-93 (1998) (defining sua sponte, ex parte
communications as judge initiated communications with an outside party).
72. FED. R. EvlD. 706, see also supra note 71.
73. Karen Butler Reisinger, CourtAppointed Expert Panels:A Comparisonof Two Models,
32 IND. L. REv. 225, 234 (1998).
74. Id. at 228.
75. Id. at 235.
76. Id. at 236.
77. Marlow, supra note 71, at 334.
78. Id. at 319. The argument for condemnation is made because the courts only consider
evidence that the litigants have had an opportunity to scrutinize, test, contradict, discredit, and
correct.
79. Judge Marlow describes that the ever-increasing complexity of technology and science,
force trial judges to make admissibility decisions in areas where they have little if any formal
training. By communicating with outside sources for an interpretation of the science involved, these
trial judges can reduce their scientific deficiencies. Id. at 292-97.
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Finally, a time may come when the courts rule that the abuse of
discretion standard used in reviewing admissibility may have to be
changed to a de novo review standard. De novo appellate decisions based
on Daubertwould allow examination of the expert testimony, not merely
the actions of the trial judge, and thus provide a higher level of review in
admissibility rulings.
The standard of admissibility of expert testimony is currently based on
the ruling in Daubert and its progeny.80 Daubert stated that expert
testimony must be based on the reliability of the methodologies employed
and must be relevant to the case at hand.8 Unfortunately, trial judges,
unskilled in the art of cutting edge science, make these decisions with little
or no outside guidance. If objective scientists disagree on the worth of each
others' methodologies, surely a lay person would be unable to determine
the value of these competing methodologies.82 Trial judges are nonscientists, yet they have the awesome responsibility of acting as
gatekeepers for scientific testimony.83 The use of Rule 706 and sua sponte
exparte communications would aid the trial judges in their difficult task.
As science and technology advance, courts must also advance in how they
evaluate, test, and admit these complex expert opinions.

80. See Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 146 (1999); Daubert,509 U.S.
at 585 (1993); General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139-41, 143 (1997); see also the Dec.
2000 revision to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The new version states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702 (2000).
81. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
82. See Lidburdy, supra note 58; National Institute of Health Guide, supra note 62. As was
shown previously with the examples of scientists unable to determine what is junk science and what
is good science.
83. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.

